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　 As the world continues to evolve so do theories of  how humans learn 
language.  The ideas proposed by linguist Noam Chomsky in the second half  
of  the 20th century continue to linger today.  The post-Chomskian thrust views 
language acquisition in terms of  constructivism.  Constructivism implies that 
learning language is less about Chomsky’s ideas of  innate grammar, studying the 
final state or language acquisition devices and more about analyzing acquisition 
processes.  This paper summarizes some of  Chomsky’s ideas, subjects them to 
critical analysis, before looking at the current movement of  alternative theories 
and considering their contributions to the current and future direction of  
Teaching English as a Second/Foreign Language (TESL/TEFL).  The paper 
concludes the current constructionist thrust represents a move away from 
Chomsky’s theoretical dominance and suggests the future of  applied linguistics is 
on the verge of  another new frontier.
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“For all its empirical weaknesses Chomsky and generative grammar has ruled 
the linguistic world for 40 years” (Tomasello, 2003)
　 The world has changed greatly since the end of  the Second World War. 
Thirteen United States presidents have served in office, a man has been put on 
the moon, medical, biological, and psychological technologies have advanced in 
leaps and bounds, and computers, the Internet, and social media have become 
essential everyday items.  The list of  modern-day changes in human existence 
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goes on.  When considering the grand scale of  these societal changes, having the 
same linguistic theory over fifty years roughly indicates one of  two things.  Either 
the theory is absolutely flawless and correct, or the academic world of  linguistics 
has reached an impasse.  Considering the time span, it would perhaps be more 
accurate to suggest the impasse occurred a while back, and that only a minority 
of  academics are posturing and toying around the frontiers of  new, revamped, 
or extended second language acquisition (SLA) theories.  It is beyond the scope 
of  this paper to speculate as to why it is taking so long for the linguistic world to 
move towards new theories.  However, with the writings of  the likes of  Pinker 
(1994, 1995), Searle (2002), Tomasello (2003), Ellis (2003), Deacon (1997) and 
others, it is worth questioning the relevance of  Chomsky’s theories in the 21st-
century world of  English as a Second Language (ESL).  In this paper I take on the 
challenge of  summarizing some of  Chomsky’s ideas and how they have influenced 
Teaching English as a Second Language (TESL).  After that I subject these ideas to 
critical analysis, before finally looking at the current thrust of  alternative theories 
and considering their contributions to the current and future direction of  TESL.
Chomsky Influence
　 It is not easy to summarize the full range of  Chomsky’s ideas.  Some 
have changed over the years, and his theory of  linguistics has evolved over 
time from syntactic structures to Universal Grammar (UG) to the Minimalist 
Program.  Chomsky himself  has fine-tuned his theory over the years.  While 
the characterization of  UG as genetics was the stated goal of  contemporary 
linguistics almost from its creation (Chomsky, 1965), empirical research had very 
little to contribute until the early 1980s when Chomsky notes: “the first major 
breakthrough took place with the principles and parameters framework ... when 
the concepts begin to be realized in terms of  concrete empirical research” (2000, 
p. 8).  It has been argued that the earlier lack of  empirical research is attributable 
to the fact that the design principles of  UG were largely unknown in detail. 
Seemingly, there were some aspects of  the model that only Chomsky himself  
could explain.  His ideas seem to provide answers to some of  our deepest puzzles 
about language and the mind.  Some of  Chomsky’s ideas are deep, complex, and 
arguably difficult, and cannot be summarized briefly.  The focus in this paper is on 
243
The Relevance of  Chomsky in 21st Century Second Language Acquisition
the relatively limited field of  Chomsky’s ideas that have influenced TESL practice, 
from the various periods of  his career. 
　 The theory originally proposed by Chomsky argued that human language had 
to be innate and intuitive.  Chomsky proposed that a child is programmed to learn 
language, and that humans are born with a Universal Grammar, a set of  rules or a 
basis for human language.  Of  UG, Chomsky said it is “the system of  principles, 
conditions and rules that are elements or properties of  all human language ... the 
essence of  human language” and “UG is a theory of  knowledge; its concern is 
with the internal structure of  the human mind” (1976, p. 29).  From this Chomsky 
implied that UG is wired in our brains, specifically through what was described as 
a Language Acquisition Device (LAD).  The LAD set the parameters for grammar 
in which a child first recognizes what kind of  language the parents are dealing 
with, and then sets his grammar to the correct one.  Children, he says, master 
grammar unconsciously.  The innate form of  language is Universal Grammar, 
which, according to this theory, is common to all languages.  It consists of  deep 
structures and surface structures as well as a natural order of  acquisition in which 
we acquire these structures in a particular order, much like computer software 
wired to the brain.
　 Chomsky never proposed any approach to language teaching, let alone second 
language teaching.  The methods that have evolved based on his theories have 
come from within the applied linguistics teaching community of  which Chomsky 
(who would no doubt agree) is no longer a subscribing member.  Worthy of  
inclusion here is the fact that Chomsky’s idea of  innatism is one of  many of  
the origins of  language that make up the array of  today’s teaching methodology. 
Included on this list are creationist theories, evolutionary theories, Chomsky’s 
nativist theory, the evolutionary nativist theory which include the likes of  Pinker 
(1994) and the language instinct and the opposing theory of  behaviorism, which is 
enjoying somewhat of  a neo-revival in the form of  connectionism.  The last point 
of  note concerns the debate over the influence of  age when learning.  Krashen et 
al.  (1975) believe there are no great differences in how a child or an adult learns 
the language: that is, they learn through unconscious acquisition.  The opposing 
view suggests that children and adults learn in different ways.  These differing 
perspectives, along with the many theories of  the origins of  language, represent 
the dynamic pool of  information from which TESL methodology evolves.
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　 Chomsky’s ideas of  innatism consider language acquisition to be a 
subconscious process.  Language teaching methodology in the mid-20th-century 
adapted to accommodate for this point of  view by gradually moving away from 
behaviorist-style learning and grammar analysis and emphasizing acquisition 
activities and communicative language teaching.  Arguably, a connection may be 
made that Chomskian ideas have played a part in the development of  CLT.  This 
is a good thing.  Chomsky’s ideas also had a great influence in SLA with Krashen 
and his Monitor Model and Natural Approach (Krashen & Terrell, 1983).  While 
this approach may not have taken root in language teaching methodologies as 
profoundly as CLT it still nonetheless lives on in the minds of  curriculum makers 
who support more humanistic methods.
Chomsky Critics
　 Tomasello (2003) recalls how Pinker, in 1984, expressed disappointment in the 
field of  language acquisition in children.  The hope in the 1960s that Chomsky’s 
UG would lead the way in describing the origins of  language didn’t gain the steam 
of  progression as anticipated.  In fact, the pace of  progression arguably lagged. 
Pinker attributed the lack of  progress to “a lack of  linguistic sophistication in the 
field” (in Tomasello, 2003, p. 323).  Pinker’s analysis concurred with Chomsky in 
that his work accepts that human language is innate and programmed in the genes. 
However, Pinker and his supporters suggested that Chomsky was wrong about 
evolution.  Pinker later described his evolutionary model in The Language Instinct 
(1994).  In it he argued that the language instinct evolved in all its complexity 
step by step over hundreds of  generations just as the human eye or an elephant’s 
trunk has evolved.  Chomsky too, no longer in denial, described an evolutionary 
model for the language instinct (Chomsky, Hauser, & Fitch, 2002).  In addition to 
this, geneticists have contributed to this debate in ways unthinkable not so long 
ago.  Cavalli-Sforza (2000), for example, described how DNA could establish the 
genetic connections among all the populations of  the world.  All of  this has led 
to a line of  theory that supports an evolutionary-nativist approach, an alliance of  
innatism and Pinker’s theory of  biogenetics.
　 Deacon (1997) believes that artificial intelligence (AI) is a very real concept. 
In his book The Symbolic Species, he rejects the idea of  UG and innate linguistic 
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knowledge and instead believes that language and the brain co-evolved: that is, 
the evolution of  the human brain was driven by language mainly through the 
development of  symbolic references (1997, p. 87).  To Deacon, language did 
not require the emergence of  a language organ.  Rather, he paints an interesting 
portrait of  the human race when he suggests that language originated from 
symbolic thinking and attributes this innovation to the time when humans became 
hunters because of  the need to overcome sexual bonding in favor of  group 
cooperation (see Scaruffi, 1999).  He claims “Chomsky’s universal grammar is an 
outcome of  the evolution of  language in our mind during our childhood.  There is 
no universal grammar in our genes ... there are no language genes in our genome” 
(Deacon in Scaruffi, 1999, p. 1).  This point of  view also counters Pinker’s 
assertion of  a relationship between genetics and language.
　 In Searle’s harsh review of  Chomsky’s New Horizons in the Study of  Language and 
Mind (2000), he concurs with Pinker when he says that after years of  the “Chomsky 
Revolution” the results are inconclusive (Searle, 2002).  He claims Chomsky 
has altered or abandoned his original theory to a point where it contradicts 
itself.  Searle comments: “Chomsky insists that the study of  language is a branch 
of  natural science” but that Chomsky’s newly revived theory of  a language 
includes a lexicon plus computations.  Searle’s objection arises from a belief  that 
“computation is not a natural science ... but an abstract mathematical notion” 
(2002).
Post-Chomsky Thrust
　 The post-Chomskian thrust really began to take momentum in the 1990s. 
Ellis (2003) wrote a seminal article that summed up the progress of  the previous 
15 years.  Ellis views the post-Chomskian thrust in terms of  constructivism. 
Within this “tribe” of  theories he includes connectionists, functional linguistics, 
emergentists, cognitive linguistics, contructivist child language researchers, applied 
linguists influenced by chaos theory, and computational linguists.  Ellis believes 
that all of  these tribes “share a functional-developmental, usage-based perspective 
on language” (2003, p. 63).  For Ellis, constructionist views of  language acquisition 
hold that “simple learning mechanisms operating in and across human systems 
for perception, motor action and cognition while exposed to language data in a 
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communicatively rich human social environment navigated by an organism eager 
to exploit the functionality of  language are sufficient to drive the emergence of  
complex language representations” (2003, p. 63).  The most compelling aspect of  
Ellis’s writing is his belief  that the structural regularities of  a language “emerge 
from a learner’s lifetime analysis of  the distributional characteristics of  the 
language” (2003, p. 64).  By this he implies that it is not a matter innate grammar 
as Chomsky believes, but rather a “statistical ensemble of  language experiences 
that changes slightly every time a new utterance is processed” (2003, p. 64).  Ellis 
suggests that the acquisition processes need to be analyzed rather than the final 
state or the language acquisition device.  Constructivists, he says, “work within 
the broad remit of  cognitive science, seeking functional and neurobiological 
descriptions of  the learning processes which, through exposure to representative 
experience, result in change, development and the emergence of  linguistic 
representations” (2003, p. 64).  This counters Chomsky’s belief  that “no discipline 
can concern itself  in a productive way with the acquisition and utilization of  a 
form of  knowledge without being concerned with the nature of  that system of  
knowledge” (1977, p. 43).
　 Cognitive Linguistics
　 The Nature-Nurture debate in science has been argued back and forth for many 
decades.  Is it our genes or our environment that determines our personality and 
behavior?  The debate stretches, overlaps, and is intertwined into other disciplines 
including psychology and applied linguistics.  Is learning a first language related to 
evolutionary-nativist theory or some sort of  neo-behaviorist (non-nativist) theory? 
To what extent can (or should) TESL instructors use this information regarding 
first language acquisition and apply it to SLA?  There is an abundance of  theories 
out there regarding how humans acquire a first language.  This paper has focused 
on Chomsky’s ideas of  innatism in acquiring language and has discussed the 
contributions/implications to TESL methods.  In addition it introduced other 
positions and compared them in relation to Chomsky.  For all of  the “newness” 
these theories claim, the reality is they may be seen as mere extensions of  the 
original nativist/non-nativist (nature/nurture) perspectives.  The addition of  
“cognitive” theories has confused things unnecessarily.  What is cognitive?  If  
we view cognitive as being related to the conscious and/or unconscious brain/
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mind then one could easily argue that Chomsky’s theory is cognitive.  Until the 
late 1980s it could be argued that cognitive theories in language acquisition have 
contributed to the confusion and lack of  progress in our field (i.e., the symbolic 
models as described in Gasser, 1990).  Without clear universal understanding of  
what is meant by cognitive, it is easy to suggest that both nativist/non-nativist 
(nature/nurture) theories contain elements of  cognitivism.  More recently, 
cognitive linguistics has been said to “provide detailed qualitative analyses of  
the ways in which language is grounded in human experience and in human 
embodiment, which represents the world in a very particular way.  The meaning of  
the words of  a given language, and how they can be used in combination depends 
on the perception and categorization of  the real world around us” (Ellis 2003, p. 
65).  Cognitive linguistics then, is said to reflect and embody the experience of  
everything we know, and everything we perceive. 
　 Constructivism
　 Tomasello has been labeled a constructivist of  the “child language research” 
variety by Ellis.  Tomasello critiques UG by viewing it as “acquisition processes 
[that] connect somehow with an innate universal grammar.” He goes on to point 
out: “but these extra processes are completely unnecessary – important to save 
a theory but not to explain the phenomenon” (2003, p. i).  The resonance of  
this statement could be fatal to some teaching methodologies.  Chomsky’s ideas 
triggered such humanistic approaches to language teaching such as Suggestopedia 
(see Lozanov, 1978) or Counseling Learning (Curran, 1976).  Without Chomsky’s 
theories these methods would scantly be justified, causing potential havoc for 
the teachers who adopt these humanistic approaches.  Tomasello takes aim at 
Chomsky in much the same way as Pinker did.  However, Tomasello goes one 
step further and also takes aim at Pinker and claims he used adult analyzing tools 
(lexical functional grammar) to discover how children become skilled users of  
a language.  Tomasello suggests Pinker had to “make a continuity assumption: 
underneath, the language of  children is structured by the same abstract categories 
and rules of  adults” (2003, p. 323).  This, Tomasello declares, “was a mistake” 
(2003, p. 324).  For Tomasello, nativist theories miss the mark.  He considers the 
recent advancements of  developmental psychology, linguistics, and cognitive 
science and concludes: “children can get from here to there ... without the aid 
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of  any hypothesized universal grammar” (2003, p. 326).  Tomasello outlines two 
skills as being particularly important for language acquisition: skills of  intention-
reading and the skills involved in various kinds of  pattern-finding-categorization. 
He argues that the essence of  language is its symbolic dimension, which rests on 
the uniquely human ability to comprehend intention.  For Tomasello, Grammar 
emerges as the speakers create language out of  recurring sequences of  symbols. 
Children pick up these patterns in the conversations they hear around them. 
Tomasello also critiques connectionism as a theory that has much to offer, 
however, at the moment he claims the models are “ ... psychologically unrealistic in 
two basic ways.  First they do not deal with communicative intentions or function 
[and] second, connectionist models [currently] work only with very small units 
such as words and grammatical morphemes” (2003, p. 24).  Tomasello offers a 
usage-based approach as an alternative to UG and connectionist models.  First, his 
model is functionalist: “based explicitly in the expression and comprehension of  
communicative intentions (intention-reading)” (2003, p. 325).  Moreover, he also 
claims his approach is construction-based.  This, he surmises, has two important 
implications: “it means that the focus is on whole utterances and constructions 
– not isolated words or morphemes – as the most fundamental units of  language 
acquisition [and] that we focus on children’s learning and use of  particular words, 
phrases, and expressions, as concrete linguistic entities” (2003, p. 326).  While 
Tomasello doesn’t breach the topic of  SLA acquisition, if  his point that language 
is theory of  mind and pattern finding is adopted, a teaching curriculum with a 
fair amount of  pragmatics, lexical grammar, and use of  the kinds of  vocabulary 
chunking found in corpus linguistics would be logical.  In addition to this, the 
communicative approach would match his theory of  intention-reading as it 
is connected with the abilities to interpret and learn the intentions of  others 
underlain by communicative intentions. 
　 By corpus linguistics it is implied that students study real, and authentic, 
examples of  language use.  Corpus-based linguistic study is done at the lexical, 
syntactic, and discourse level.  In addition, Sinclair claims that meaning has an 
important effect on structure.  If  a word has two meanings, “it is possible to 
predict that it has two structures and this is only made possible by studying 
examples of  language in use” (1997, p. 35).  From this perspective, it is clear 
that teaching must be meaningful.  It’s no use teaching an ESP writing class (for 
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example, to a group of  travel agents) how to write academic papers.  The class 
time would be much better spent learning how to interpret and respond to faxes, 
or how to write emails and doing tasks or activities that have real-life meaning for 
the students. 
　 Connectionism
　 Connectionist theories of  the late 1980s and 90s attempted to narrow the 
focus of  the term cognitivism.  Connectionism is a movement that attempts to 
explain human intellectual abilities and the learning process using artificial neural 
networks.  Connectionists liken the brain to a computer, and artificial neural 
networks are simplified models of  the brain composed of  large numbers of  
nodes/units (the analogues of  neurons) together with weights that measure 
the strength of  connections between the units.  The links between units are 
strengthened or weakened through activation or non-activation respectively. 
Experiments on models of  this kind have been used to demonstrate an ability to 
acquire language.  Connectionism differs from standard cognitive/nativist theories 
in that it views learning on the basis of  associated processes, rather than the 
construction of  abstract rules.  The traditional view is that cognitive processes are 
assumed to be in a serial order, whereas the connectionist model views cognitive 
processes to be parallel.  In relating connectionism to L1 acquisition Rumelhart 
and McClelland (1986) developed a new computational framework that supposedly 
mimicked neural networks for understanding the cognitive processes.  Their model 
reproduced closely the way in which children acquire the past tense in English. 
The computer generalized on the basis of  stored examples in a similar way to 
children.  In SLA as well, a number of  researchers have explored connectionism. 
In one study, Sokolik and Smith (1992) investigated the assignment of  gender to 
French nouns using a connectionist framework.  They devised a computer-based 
connectionist type network model that learned to identify correctly, the gender of  
a set of  French nouns.  The model was then able to generalize from that learning 
experience and assign gender to previously unstudied nouns with a higher degree 
of  reliability.  Learning, in this view, is thought to take place as the strength of  
given inter-connections between nodes increases as the associative patterns are 
repeated over time.  Key to this type of  learning is that the learner does not extract 
rules and then apply them, but merely registers associative patterns that strengthen 
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with use.  The analogy of  a computer’s cache memory comes to mind.  When you 
type in a URL on a computer, it relays messages to different points on the Internet 
ahead magically displaying the web page of  the assigned URL.  A simplified 
example of  a message-relaying path would include a request from your computer 
to your host provider, from your host provider to an international server, and from 
the international server to the server of  the webpage of  the URL you typed.  The 
return trip is made, and thus the page appears (in milliseconds) on your computer 
screen.  Without the use of  cache memory, the process of  accessing web pages 
in your computer’s browser takes more time.  However, the cache memory on 
your computer records all the information from all the servers required to access 
the websites you frequent most.  By doing this it saves time when you connect to 
the same web page, recognizing the path of  the URL before it is even completely 
typed in your browser.  In making the analogy with connectionism, the various 
Internet servers your URL request goes through can represent the nodes, units, 
and neurons of  your brain.  The strength of  connection between these servers 
(and therefore the speed of  connection between your computer and the web page) 
is demonstrated by the frequency of  visits from your computer to the URL (this 
is accounted for in the cache memory).  The computer can communicate more 
fluently with the various Internet servers that are recorded in the computer’s hard 
drive (the web pages that are “activated” in the computer’s cache memory) than 
with servers that are not recorded (or web pages that are “non-activated” in the 
cache). 
　 Before discussing the issue of  implications of  the connectionist model to 
TESL methods, it is important to discuss the ways in which SLA may differ 
from first language acquisition.  The first consideration is that of  the patterns 
themselves.  L1 patterns may or may not transfer to L2 and vice versa.  Moreover, 
the neurophysiological changes or cognitive developments not related specifically 
to language may limit the learner’s ability to acquire language or may predispose 
the learner to particular acquisition strategies.  In addition, contextual factors, 
such as the acquisition setting or the communicative demands placed on the 
learner, may affect acquisition.  These factors need to be taken into account when 
applying a connectionist model to TESL methods.  When the connectionist model 
is applied, a number of  implications arise.  The first involves the definition of  a 
linguistic item.  In pre-Chomsky days, linguistic items were fairly easily defined 
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(phonemes, morphemes, structures).  Generative grammar led to a major emphasis 
on the grammatical rules as critical items to be learned as part of  the knowledge 
base.  Connectionist approaches suggest an even more complex composition of  
phonetic and lexical features as part as part of  the base of  linguistic knowledge.  
　 In response to Rumelhart and McClelland’s research, Pinker and Prince (1988) 
point out that the model does a poor job of  generalizing to some novel regular 
verbs.  They claim that networks may be good at making associations and matching 
patterns, but they have fundamental limitations in mastering general rules such 
as the formation of  the regular past tense.  Therefore one of  the biggest strikes 
against connectionism, according to them, is that the nets are not good at the kind 
of  ‘rule-based’ processing that is thought to be fundamental to language learning. 
Nets do not take into account other factors of  the brain such as different types of  
neurons and the influence of  hormones.  Others argue that the analogy to neural 
networks in the brain is too loose.  The connectionist model is not without its 
critics.  However, it comes as no surprise that most of  the critical waves created 
ultimately emanate from the Chomsky/neo-Chomsky nativist camp. 
　 The implications of  connectionist theory for SLA teaching models include 
a reliance on whole language and lexical patterns over traditional form-focused 
instruction.  As the model is data driven, clearly linguistic input heard by the 
language learner is essential.  The theory suggests that what goes in as linguistic 
input, come out as well-formed language.  Connectionist models of  teaching 
should be designed so that the lexical patterns are easy to memorize.  Miller’s (1956) 
Magical Number Seven experiment indicates levels of  information retention. 
Therefore, when teaching or reinforcing lexical patterns it is best to organize 
them with this principle in mind.  When encouraging the reinforcement of  lexical 
patterns, students need to be given the chance to use the language in meaningful 
contexts.  This will encourage the weighting and activation of  lexical patterns in 
the brain.  The use of  corpora in presenting lexical patterns is useful, in that the 
learner will be exposed to commonly used lexis. 
Discussion
　 While Chomsky’s original ideas of  innatism have arguably run their course, 
the baby has not been thrown out with the bath water.  Where then, do we stand 
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today in the world of  theories of  language acquisition?  What direction are we 
going in?  I still see only two conflicting theories: nature vs.  nurture or, in this 
case, nativist vs.  non-nativist theories.  On one side, we have the nativists led by 
the likes of  Chomsky and Pinker.  On the other, we have the non-nativists, led by 
Ellis (2003) and his various tribes of  constructivists.  The recent thrust in both 
of  these sides can be attributed to the use of  cognitive science to strengthen their 
positions.  Pinker (1995) describes the advancements made on both sides and 
attributes them to “a diverse set of  conceptual and methodological tools [that] has 
been used to trap the elusive answers to our questions: neurobiology, ethnology, 
linguistic theory, naturalistic and experimental child psychology, cognitive 
psychology, philosophy of  induction, theoretical and applied computer science. 
Language acquisition, then, is one of  the best examples of  the indispensability of  
the multidisciplinary approach called cognitive science” (1995, p. 176).  The future 
of  these theories as they stand today is unclear.  However, it seems likely that 
someday an accommodation will arise.  Clearly, input is essential in first language 
acquisition, but this input must somehow supply data for a linguistic mechanism 
that has evolved in the human species and that is possessed by all humans.  Fifty 
years from now our grandchildren might know which of  these theories is correct, 
or perhaps there is a happy medium. 
　 From the perspective of  language acquisition as drawing upon multiple 
disciplines it is worth considering the findings of  physicists at the University 
of  Cambridge in the UK.  Josephson (1997), describes his integrated theory of  
nervous system functioning embracing nativism and constructivism, by comparing 
algorithmic and constructivist approaches and then presenting his third option, 
an integrated approach.  In applying this approach to language, Josephson adapts 
a proposal of  Elman: “If  children develop a robust drive to solve [the problem 
of  mapping non-linear thoughts on to a highly constrained linear channel], 
and are born with processing tools to solve it, then the rest may simply follow 
because it is the natural solution to that particular mapping process” (Elman et al., 
1996).  Josephson’s adaptation of  this says, “if  the possibility of  innate systems 
dedicated to language is not ruled out in accord with the dictates of  the evangelical 
constructivists, then we can change the above account to allow for a collection of  
specific drives relevant to aspects of  language acquisition, and for specific tools 
that take into account universals of  linguistic structure, and the corresponding 
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classifications” (Josephson, 1997).  Josephson concludes that a “dynamical 
systems approach can integrate the algorithmic and neural network approaches to 
development, permitting the respective advantages of  both schemes to be both 
retained and integrated” (1997).  The implications in practice for language have 
been made by Josephson and Blair (1996).  They call for a holistic approach to 
language, and while their original research may be considered ahead of  its time, 
they seem fully aware of  this: “it is not feasible at this stage in the research to 
attempt to make the theory perfect and to study exhaustively all permutations 
and combinations of  the concepts involved....  The present work can be only a 
first approximation to the truth, and future research will be needed to amend any 
errors and add further necessary detail” (Josephson & Blair 1996).
　 Conclusion
　 The evolutionary-nativists and the non-nativist constructivists have given the 
world of  applied linguistics a breath of  fresh air.  While remnants of  Chomsky’s 
ideas of  innatism remain with the nativists, the thrust of  momentum in 
constructivism gives linguists a chance to explore theories outside of  the Chomsky 
box.  The current constructivist thrust represents a swing in the pendulum away 
from Chomsky’s theoretical dominance.  The expanse of  the constructivist tribe 
overlaps into many disciplines.  The future of  applied linguistics is on the verge of  
yet another new frontier.  One can hope that this new frontier doesn’t stagnate and 
linger for decades as Chomsky’s did (and arguably still does).  The complexities of  
first and second language acquisition may or may not be fully understood in our 
lifetime.  However, as linguists and teachers it is our responsibility to continue the 
search for answers, using all of  the knowledge accrued and all of  the technology 
available.
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